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NOTES
TRUST COMPANIES AND THE "PRACTICE

OF LAw."-When.

the New York Court of Appeals in 191o made its decision in "Re
Co-operative Law Co.,"' it established the now universally conceded proposition that a corporation cannot practice law. Thestatute2 under discussion in that case provided that "three or
more persons may become a stock corporation for any lawful
business." It was argued that since the practice of law was a
lawful business, the incorporation of three or more persons for
that purpose was within the statute. But the practice of law is
not a lawful business save to those who have complied with certain statutory requirements and who have fulfilled the conditions
1198 N. Y. 479,92 N. E. 15 (i9io).
2Chap. 483, Laws of i909 (N. Y.).
(356)
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required by the rules of court. "The right to practice law is
in the nature of a franchise from the State, conferred only for
merit. It cannot be assigned or inherited, but must be earned
by hard study and good conduct. .
.
No one can practice
law unless he has taken an oath of office and has become an officer
of the court, subject to its discipline, liable to punishment for
contempt in violating his duties as such, and to suspension or
removal." It is evident that a corporation cannot perform these
conditions; and it therefore would seem to follow that the practice of law is not a lawful business in which a corporation can
engage. And since it cannot practice law directly, neither can
it do so indirectly by employing members of the bar to practice
for it. The law will not tolerate such an evasion.' When legislatures, therefore, in authorizing the formation of corporations,
use the general expression "any lawful business," they do not
intend to include the work of the learned professions wherein4
personal skill and personal responsibility are the prime essentials.
Within the last fifty years, there have developed certain
types of corporation to fill very *apparent and growing needs.
In all communities, whenever a piece of property was sold, there
was an examination of the title; and if it were sold again, there
had to be another examination, and so on. The result was delay
and needless expense to the public; and the outcome is the presentday title company, which examines the title, insures it, and saves
the expense to the public.
In a like manner, trust companies were brought into being
to fill a public need. Estates were left to individual executors
or trustees, who might or might not be careless or dishonest, but
whose personal ability and conscience were the only safeguards
on which the heirs or cestuis qui trustent could rely. The trust
companies were incorporated to give the public the absolute protection which this condition showed to be necessary. The affairs
of the incorporated trustee or executor are watched over carefully
by the State. The trust company never removes, falls ill, or
dies. The heirs or the cestuis gui trustent are always insured that
protection which the testator would wish to be exercised.
It is not strange that these title and trust companies, in
the performance of their duties as such, should perform certain
incidental acts which the individual title examiner or trustee
would find necessary to do in similar circumstances. And since,
before the advent of trust companies, the individual title examiner or trustee was usually a lawyer, it follows that title and trust
companies are today doing certain things which in the past were
generally considered to be within the province of the lawyer.
;"Quando aliguid prohibefur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum" Co.
Litt. 223.
'Commonwealth v. Alba Dentist Co., 13 Pa. Dist. Rep. 432 (1904) (Den-

listry); People v. Woodbury Dermatological Inst.,
(igo8) (Medicine).

192

N. Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697
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The realization of this fact has led to country-wide discussion
by members of the bars of the various states,5 and has finally
crystallized in the prosecution and acquittal of a New York corporation. The difference of opinion which prevails concerning
the right of corporations to do certain things heretofore done by
lawyers is shown by the fact that the Court of Appeals of New
York, by a divided court, reversed the judgment of the Supreme
Court which had affirmed the conviction. The facts of the case,
that of People v. Title Guarantee& Trust Co.,6 are typical of what
is being done by most of the title and trust companies. There
was no pretense or holding out by advertisement or otherwise
that the company was entitled to practice law. There was no
legal advice given. In the course of its business, the company
was called on to draw a bill of sale and a chattel mortgage, and
it did so. New York has a penal statute 7 which declares: "It
shall be unlawful for any corporation . . . to hold itself out
to the public as being entitled to practice law, or render or furnish legal services or advice, or to furnish attorneys or counsel
or to render legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings
of any nature or in any other way or manner, or in any other
manner to assume to be entitled to practice law. . . . This
section shall not apply to any corporation . . . lawfully engaged in the examination and insuring of titles to real property.
.
. * But no corporation shall be permitted to render any
services which cannot lawfully be rendered by a person not admitted to practice law in the State."
Under this statute, the company was prosecuted. It was
argued that, though not requiring deep legal knowledge, the drafting of a bill of sale and a chattel mortgage is work which is usually
done by lawyers, and since advice as to change of possession of
the chattels and filing the mortgage should be given, the whole
transaction constituted the practice of law.
No one will deny that the "practice of law," as the term
is now commonly used, embraces much more than the conduct of
litigation. The concise definition given by the Supreme Court
of the United States has been taken as authority in numerous
cases: "Persons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations, or proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients may be regarded as attorneys-at-law, within the meaning of
that designation as employed in this country", s
Is the drawing of wills, deeds, bonds, mortgages, bills of
sale, and other like instruments the "practice of law" sufficient
to convict the title and trust companies which do such work in
5
See: The American Bar Assoc. Journal for January, 1920, pp. 19-31;
Reports of State Bar Assoc. of Wisconsin, Vol. 12, pp. 587-614.
B125 N. E. 666 (i919).
7
See 280 Penal Law (Consol. Laws, C. 40).

sSavings Bank v. Ward, IOO U. S. I95, i99 (1879); Re John T. Duncan,

83 S. C. 186, 65 S. E.

210 (1909).
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the course of the business for which they are incorporated? The
test is not whether the act done is one which is commonly performed by an attorney. The inquiry is rather whether it is an
act which might lawfully be performed by a layman. The basis
of decision should be the nature of the act, and not the identity
-of the individual who most frequently performs it.
To support the contention that the title and trust companies cannot draw such papers for pay is to hold that such work
is the professional business of the lawyer exclusively. That contention is against legal history and tradition. The advocate
never did the work of a conveyancer. The scrivarius of the civil
law and his successor, the continental notary' public, always did
such clerical work and were never admitted to the ranks of professional lawyers? In England, the notary public was always
allowed to prepare deeds, agreements, wills, and other papers
relating to real and personal property.0 Indeed, far from being,
the ancient right of lawyers only, the preparation and execution
of instruments to alienate land and conveyancing in general were
not even open for attorneys or solicitors to engage in before 176o.
The Scriveners' Company had a close monopoly of all such business; and not until that year did the "Society of Gentlemen Practisers in the Courts of Law and Equity" gain the right also to
draw such instruments.'
Stronger, however, than the historical proof that such business is not the exclusive privilege of lawyers is the fact that in
all the jurisdictions of the United States laymen have been accustomed to draw such instruments, not merely as a matter of
accommodation for friends and neighbors, but for pay. Indeed,
the New York court in the case under discussion 2 took judicial
notice of this practice. And when Congress laid revenue duties
on different pursuits and professions, it recognized the wide range
of legal services by persons not attorneys at law. It grouped
these under the name "Conveyancer," which the act" defined as:
"Every person, other than one having paid the special tax as a
lawyer or claim agent, whose business it is to draw deeds, bonds,
mortgages, wills, writs, or other legal papers, or to examine titles
to real estate."
If the drafting of legal documents could be done only by
lawyers, then it would seem to follow that communications between the client and the one doing his conveyancing would be
privileged. But it is universally held that where an attorney
9Wright: French Civil Code, arts. 971, 972; Golirand: French Commercial
Law, pp. 9, IO, i; Todd: Belgian Law with Codes of Commerce & Procedure
p.

iI.

.°Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 21,
Sec. 817; King v. Scriveners'
Co., io Barnewall & Cresswell 511 (Eng. 1830).
"Encyc. Laws of England (2nd Ed.) Vol. 13, p. 438 "Solicitor."
1I25
N. E. 666 (i919).
"3Act Cong. July 13, 1866, C. 184, Sec. 9, 14 U. S. Stat. at Large p. I8.
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is employed merely to put in legal form and phrase certain documents or agreements of the parties, the fact that he is skilled in
law will not make him incompetent as a witness, nor can the communication made by the parties to him be considered as privileged. 14 From this it appears that conveyancing is not the practice of law and the conveyancer not only is not required to be an
attorney-at-law but cannot be considered as acting in the capacity
of an attorney-at-law. How, then, is it possible to escape the
conclusion that when a title or trust company drafts legal papers
ancillary to its business it is not practising law?
In Pennsylvania, a lower court opinionli contains a dictum
to the effect that a title insurance company cannot do conveyancing
of any kind. But the statutory provisionis in regard to the powers
of such companies is "to make insurances of every kind pertaining
to or connected with titles to real estate, and to make, execute
and perfect such and so many contracts, agreements, policies,
and other instruments as may be required therefor." Under this
statute it would seem that any conveyancing done incidental
to the generally conceded duties of a title and trust company is
not ultra vires. Certainly, it is not the practice of law.
There can be no debate of the proposition that the standards
of the legal profession should be maintained at a very high level.
Nor is it contested that much more harm comes to the public
from ignorance and carelessness than from the intentional misconduct of those who have succeeded in securing the right to
practice law. But this does not furnish a reason for conferring
upon attorneys the exclusive right to render certain services as
if they were incapable of being performed by a layman when
common and long-established practice points in a different direction. And if these services are not the usurpation of the lawyers'
duties when rendered by laymen, neither are they the "practice
of law" when performed by title or trust companies.
A.L.
A NEW CONCEPTION OF RESTRAINT IN FALSE IMPRISONMENT.-The gist of the wrong of false imprisonment, which is the
violation of the right of personal liberty, is the unlawful restraint
of the freedom of the person. As stated by Blackstone: "To
constitute the injury of false imprisonment there are two points
requisite: (I) the detention of the person; and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention. Every confinement of the person is an
imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or in a private
house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the
14
Delger v. Jacobs, i9 Cal. App. 197, 125 Pac. 258 (1912); Spencer v.
Razor, 251 Ill., 278, 96 N. E. 300 (1911); Dikeman v. Arnold, 78 Mich. 455,44
N. W. 407 (1889); Van Alstyne v. Smith. 82 Hun. 382, 31 N.Y. S. 277 (I894)See also
Estate of Mathews, i Phila. 292 (1852).
15
Gauler v. Solicitor's Loan & Trust Co., 9 Pa. C. C. Rep. 634 (1891).
6
Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. i59.
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public streets."' The wrong is complete whenever there is a
yielding to another of the right to determine for one's self whether
6ne will move at all, and if so, in what direction. 2 But where the
right of choice has been exercised and the determination to move
or stay has not been caused by submission to force, threats of
force, show of authority, or any words or acts which the person
fears to disregard, there is no imprisonment.'
Where the person is unconscious of the fact that he is not
free to move when, where, and how he chooses, it is difficult to
perceive how there can be an imprisonment within the requirements of the tort action. It is a contradiction in terms to say
that a man is restrained of his liberty to move as he wills, when
in fact he is permitted to move in the direction in which he desires
to go, though had he attempted to move in any other way he
would have been prevented. There is,properly speaking, no
restraint of liberty without submission of the will; no false imprisonment without knowledge that barriers exist. Yet the Court
of Appeal of England in the recent case of Meering v. GrahameWhite Aviation Company, Limited,' one judge dissenting, holds
that it is possible for a person to be imprisoned in law without
his being conscious of the fact and appreciating the position in
which he is placed. In this case a young man was suspected of
having stolen certain articles from his employer. A private
policeman was sent to his house to tell him "that his presence
was desired up at the works." He complied with this request
and upon his arrival at the works asked "what they wanted him
for, and said that if they did not tell him he should go away. They
then told him that what they wanted him for was to make inquiries because there had been things stolen and he was wanted
to give evidence. On that statement he stayed." 5 There was
evidence that if he had attempted to leave, as he believed he might
at any time if he so desired, he would have been restrained. In
an action for false imprisonment the Court held that this was
sufficient evidence to justify a finding by the jury that the plaintiff
had been detained.
Hitherto in actions for false imprisonment the test always
has been whether or not any unlawful restraint has been imposed;
if the latest announcement of the Court of Appeal is accepted
the test hereafter will be whether or not there was an intention
'Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. III, p. 127.
2Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212, (Eng. 1838); Warner v. Riddiford, 4.
C. B. N. S. i8o (Eng. 1858); Searles v. Viets. 2 Thomp. & Cook, 224 (N. Y.
1873); Whitman v. Atchinson, etc., R. R. Company, 85 Kans. 150, 116 Pac.
234 (1911).

3Payson v. Macomber, 3 Allen 69 (Mass. 1861); Hershey v. O'Neill, 36
Fed. 168 (1888); Kirk & Son v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 35 AtI. 1O89 (1896); Gunderson v. Struebing, 125 Wis. 173, 104 N. W. 149 (19o5); Foulke v. N. Y. Cons.
R. R. Company, 18o N. Y. App. Div. 848 (1917).
4122 Law Times 44 (Eng. 1919).
5Id. Statement by Warrington, L. J., p. 46.

362

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

It is believed that
to impose restraint in a certain contingency.
the error of this holding is demonstrable by both principle and
authority. The principle underlying all the cases cited above,
though perhaps not always stated in so many words, is, that to
constitute this wrong, force of some sort must be used and the
detention must be against the will-the union of these two cirCan it be said that
cumstances being considered indispensable.
there is not a free exercise of the will merely because all the facts
are not brought to the actor's notice? Or can it be said that a
person is detained against his will by a showing of facts of which
he was entirely unaware until long after the event? It is well in
this connection to remember that false imprisonment always
includes a technical, if not actual, assault, the use of actual or

implied force being necessary. 6 It seems clear that a civil assault
at least cannot be committed without the knowledge of the facts

claimed to constitute the offence by the person supposed to have
been assaulted. 7 From this it follows that there was no assault
in the Meering case, for the only constructive force which can be
suggested was the presence of persons who intended to interfere
if the plaintiff attempted to leave.
As indicated above, this was not a case of first impression
in England, a directly contrary adjudication having been rendered

in the case of Herring v. Boyles nearly a century before.

There

it was held that a schoolboy could not maintain an action for
false imprisonment against his schoolmaster who improperly refused to deliver him up to his mother, without evidence that he
knew of such refusal and of some actual restraint upon him, Bol9
land B., saying, "I think that we cannot construe the refusal
to the mother in the boy's absence, and without his being cognizant of any restraint, to be an imprisonment of him against

his will."' 1

Another case reaching a like conclusion is Macintosh

65 Corpus Juris 521.
7
Sir F. Pollock "The Law of Torts," (Ioth ed.) 214, note (e). It seems
that a criminal assault may be committed upon one who has no knowledge of
the facts, People v. Pape, 66 Cal. 366 (1885). But see State v. Barry, 45 Mont.
598, 124 Pac. 775 (1912) contra. The difference in principle between the civil
and criminal offenses so far as this point is involved is well stated in the dissenting opinion of Smith, J., in the latter case. "I do not thinkthe apprehension
of a battery is necessarily confined to the person toward whom the weapon is
directed. . . . Such apprehension may be excited in the breast of a third
person, as was the case here. Any man is authorized to prevent a battery upon
another, and if an assault is made by A upon B who is ignorant of it, but under
such circumstances as to excite apprehension on the part of C, a bystander,
that B is about to become the victim of a battery, it is the duty of C to interfere,
and the offense on A's part is complete. It is not the peace of B that is disturbed,
but that of the public."
:i C. M. & R. 377 (Eng. 1834).
9i C. M. & R. 381.
10
1n Robalina v. Armstrong, 15 Barb. 247 (N. Y. 1852) and Commonwealth
v. Nickerson, 5 Allen 518 (Mass. 1862) it was held that children aged seven and
nine years respectively, who were wrongfully withheld from those lawfully
entitled to their custody were falsely imprisoned, regardless of the child's wishes
in the matter, on the ground that a child of that age was incapable of assenting
to the restraint.

NOTES

v. Cohen," where a man went voluntarily with officers of the law
to have charges against him investigated, though the police testified that if an attempt to get away had been made, they would
have stopped him.
There is little to be said in defence of the decision by the
Court of Appeal. Though the opinions of the judges are lengthy,
there is a notable failure to cite any case in support of this innovation in the law12 and an analysis of the judges' opinions shows
them to be but the expression of personal views, quite unsupported by authority, and there is no attempt to reason from established principles. It is not believed that this departure from
settled principles of law is desirable. The question involved,
though perhaps academic in the Meering Case, is not an unimportant one, for actions of this character are not infrequent, and
in them the fact of imprisonment is often the principal one to be
ascertained. The right of personal liberty is sufficiently protected
when redress is given for its violation, and to extend the remedy
to cases where the right has not actually been infringed is to impose liability on others for one's own actions and allow recovery
therefor-a complete denial of the ancient maxim volenti non fit
injuria.
O. P. M.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WAGE REGULATION AS DEPENDENT ON THE CHARACTER OF THE EMPLOYMENT.-A statute of
Rhode Island, entitled "Of diminishing danger to life in case of
fire" provided that the theatre licensees of certain cities in that
state should employ, at a salary of not less than three dollars per
day, a suitable person approved by the board of fire commissioners
thereof "to perform such duties as from time to time may be
prescribed by such board to guard against fire." The act further
provided that "no such employee . . . shall be discharged
by such licensee or licensees from his said employment nor his
salary reduced except with the prior approval of said board."
Previous to the passing of this statute one Gallagher had
been employed as fireguard by a theatre licensee in the city of
Providence at a salary of two dollars a day, and had been approved
by the board of fire commissioners. On the refusal of the theatre
licensee to increase Gallagher's salary to three dollars, as required
by the statute, a complaint was brought against the licensee in
question and he was found guilty. Sentence was stayed after
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the Act was
1124 New Zealand L. R. 625 (1904).

"2A definition of "imprisonment" is taken from "Termes de la Ley" and
Bird v. Jones, 7 Q. B. 742 (Eng. 1845) and Warner v. Riddiford, 4C. B. N. S.
i8o (Eng. 1858) are cited to show that restraint must be within a particular
space, and that there can be imprisonment without in fact laying hands upon the
person of the party imprisoned.
'Sect. 5, Chap. 131, R. I. General Laws, i9o9, as amended by Chap. 1780
of R. I. Public Laws, i919.
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unconstitutional, and the case2 was certified to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court on this point. By a divided court the act was held
unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution insofar as it fixed the wage to be paid
to the fireguard and prevented the licensee from discharging him
without the consent of the fire-commissioners.
The constitutionality of this act would seem to turn on a
question of fact, viz., was the fireguard in the employ of the theatre
licensee, or was he in reality in the employ of the fire-commissioners?
If the former be true, it is, at least, open to question whether the
case was correctly decided. If on the other hand, as the dissenting justices contend, no relation of master and servant existed
between fireguard and theatre manager under the act, then, by
the weight of authority the court's decision is wrong. If the fireguard's employment be private or even if it be "affected with a
public interest" the problem resolves itself into a determination
whether the legislature has made a valid use of its police power or
whether the provisions of the act are so arbitrary as to deprive
the defendant of his liberty to contract as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Admitting that the relation between fireguard and theatre
manager is a purely private one, as is held by the majority of
the court, a view supported by the phraseology of the act which
specifically uses the word "employ" in speaking of the relationship, still the duties of the guard are clearly subject to the surveillance of the state, as they undoubtedly affect the safety of a
large body of the public. In Tannebaum v. Rehm 3 an act of the
legislature making it incumbent upon theatre managers to protect their patrons by submitting to the presence of a competent
fireguard during performances was held a valid exercise of the
state's police power, although the case turned on another point.
The other cases which hold that the business of conducting a
theatre is a purely private one, involve only the contractual relations existing between the theatre manager and his patrons.'
But the majority of the court in the principal case, although recognizing that the fireguard's duties are affected with a public interest, conclude that the provision of the act relating to the wage
and to the power to discharge is unessential insofar as the public
safety is concerned, and is, for this reason, unconstitutional, since
it does not bear any "real and substantial relation" 5 to the subject matter-the public safety over which the police power could
be exercised. In other words, these clauses are too remote from
the legitimate purposes of the act. 6 That a statutory provision
2

0'Neill v. Providence Amusement Co., io8 Atl. 887 (R. I.

1920.)

Ala. 494 (r907).
'See Buenzle v. Newport Amusement Assoc., 29 R. I. 23, 68 Ath.721 (19o8);
3i52

Homey v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 2o, 61 Atl. lO88 (19o5); People v. Steele, 231 Ill.
340
(1907);5 contra semble Western Turf Assoc. v. Greenburg, 204 U. S. 359 (19o6).
That it was for the court to determine whether the statute in controversy bore "any real and substantial relation" to the exercise of the police power
in order to test the constitutionality of the statute, was first laid down in the
case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887), and has been cited with approval
in many subsequent cases.

NOTES

not a police regulation cannot be made such by the use of a title
calling it such, or by being placed in the same act with a police
regulation by enactment under a title declaring a proper purpose
for the exercise of the power, is well settled. 7 Of equal authority
is the proposition laid down in McLean v. Arkansas,8 where the
court said, "The Legislature, being familiar with local conditions,
is, primarily, the judge of the necessity of such enactments. The
mere fact that a court may differ with the Legislature in its views
of public policy, or that judges may hold views inconsistent with
the propriety of the legislation in question, affords no grounds
for judicial interference, unless the act in question is unmistakably
and palpably in excess of legislative power." From these two
propositions and from numerous cases involving questions in
which the police power of the state is arrayed against the "due
process" clause of the Federal Constitution and vice versa, two
tests have been applied by the courts: first, is the purpose of the
act within the police power of the state?; second, is it arbitrary?
Applying these tests to the facts of the main case, while
still assuming that the relation of employer and employee exists
between the manager and the fireguard, as far as the clause fixing
the wage is concerned, it is apparent that there is no authority
which has gone so far as to allow the fixing of a minimum wage by
the legislature in the case of a man in one form of employment,
as contradistinguished from all other employments. Such an
abridgement of the freedom to contract for labor, which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 would seem, as this court
has pronounced it, arbitrary. Neither the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in the case' which arose to test the constitutionality of the Adamson Act, nor that of the Oregon Supreme
Court in the cases" upholding the constitutionality of minimum
wage legislation could be cited as authority to uphold such wage
legislation as is present in the main case. The former case is
distinguishable because it was not a minimum wage law, but an
emergency act, temporary in its nature; and subserving a public
purpose of vital importance, viz., the prevention of a nationwide strike and the consequent tying-up of commerce. The
Oregon cases (supra), although they do involve the constitution6
Unconstitutionality of an act because its end is too remote from the
valid exercise of a federal power is a determining test in Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S.
I6i (19o8). Same test applied to state's police power, Coppage v. Kansas,

236 U.7 S. I (1914).

1n re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 (1885); Lochner v. New York, i98 U. S., 45
Coppage v. Kansas (supra); Bemis v. State, 12 Okl. Cr. Rep. 114,
Pac. 456 (i915).
82II U. S. 539 (1908).

(9o4);
152

OAdair v. U. S., (supra); Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630 (1914); Coppage

v. Kansas,
(supra).
' 0Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
"Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519 (914); Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Ore. 261
(1914).
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ality of the minimum wage, can be distinguished in that they
relate solely to women and minors, the preservation of whose
health is of importance to the community as a whole, whose physical structure and inability to organize for collective bargaining
make them fit subjects for the protection of the police power and
justify legislation of this character in their favor, notwithstanding
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 The grounds upon
which these decisions are based are inapplicable to the principal case.
But, as to their application of the proper law to the facts,
a different question is presented. The dissenting judges strenuously assert, and the facts apparently sustain their conclusion,
that the relation of master and servant, employer and employee,
does not exist between manager and fireguard. "The relation
of master and servant exists," says Judge Rathbun, "only when
• . . (citing 26 Cyc. 966) 'the employer retains the right to
direct the manner in which the business shall be accomplished,
or, in other words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall
be done."' And again (citing 26 Cyc. 965), "He is to be deemed
a master who has the superior choice, control, and direction of
the servant, and whose will the servant represents, not merely
in the ultimate result of the work but in the details." Applying
the provisions of the statute (supra), admittedly constitutional
in the opinion of the majority insofar as it provides for the stationing of the fireguard and the approval of the commissioners,
the dissenting justice concludes that the essential elements of the
relationship of master and servant as set forth in the above definition are entirely lacking, even though the statute expressly uses
the word "employ" to express the relationship and even though
the selection (subject, of course, to the approval of the commissioners) and payment are in the hands of the theatre manager.
A fortiori, then, if the fireguard is not in the relation of employee to the theatre manager, he is employed by the municipality,
and hence is in public employment. It follows therefore, that
his superiors, the fire commissioners, could be constitutionally
vested with the right to discharge him.
In the matter of the compulsory payment of a public employee by a private citizen of a wage fixed by the legislature, the
dissenting justices draw an analogy to the charging of inspection
fees by a public officer against an individual engaged in a private
business, the nature of which requires inspection to protect the
welfare of the community. That the charging of such fees as
are fixed by the legislature is not depriving the individual of his
property without due process of law is well settled. 13
"2For cases in which the constitutionality of labor legislation in favor of
women and minors has been upheld see Com. v. Wormser, 26o Pa. 44 (1918);
Holcombe v. Creamer, 231 Mass. 99, 12o N. E. 354 (1918); Muller v. Oregon,
208 U. S.412 (2908).
;'Willis v. Standard Oil Co., 5o Minn. 290, 52 N. W. 652 (1892); Consolidated Coal Co. v. People, i86 11. 134, 57 N. E. 880 (29oo); New Orleans
v Kee,

207

La. 762, 31 So.

2024 (1920);

of Health, x8 U. S. 455 (2885).

Morgans S. S. Co., v Louisiana Board

NOTES

It is submitted, however, that this legislation more nearly
resembles the class of legislation upheld by the United States
1
Supreme Court in the case of Charlotte Railroad Co. v. Gibbs,
whereby the railroads of the South Carolina were assessed the
cost of the upkeep of a state railroad commission, or that which
fixes a minimum wage for laborers employed by the municipality
for the benefit of the property of an individual, against whose
property the wage is assessed as a special tax, or who can be required to pay under a valid exercise of police power, provided the
duty performed by the public servant comes within its scope.
Or, as is said by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Atkin v. Kansas, 5 "The power belongs to a state as guardian of
the people to prescribe conditions upon which public work will
be done in its behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities," and adds
that the manner of payment does not as such change the character of the work. Legislation of this class is upheld in Malette v.
Spokane.1
C. W. B. T.
DAMAGES FOR INCON ENIENCE AND ANNOYANCE BY WRONGFUL ACT OF TELEPHONE COMPANY.-It seems from a recent decision of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas that a person can
now recover damages for an injury to his temper, at least if the
offending party happens to be a telephone company. In Southwestern Telegraph and Teldphone Co. v. Riggs,, a verdict of $250
for vexation, annoyance and inconvenience, caused by the Telephone Co. wrongfully disconnecting the plaintiff's phone, was
upheld as supported by the evidence and not so excessive as to
show passion or prejudice.
That a telephone company can be held liable in a tort action
for annoyance and inconvenience to a subscriber by wrongfully
disconnecting his phone, as well as for actual pecuniary loss, is
now fairly well established.' But as Pleasants, C. J. points out
in his able dissenting opinion, the evidence in the principal case
shows no inconvenience resulting directly from the plaintiff's
inability to use his phone, and shows only the deleterious effect
on the plaintiff's disposition caused by the untactful manner of
the company's officials.
The plaintiff had in fact paid his bill, but the defendant's
bookkeeper had accidentally credited the payment to "Capital
1923" instead of to "Capital 1928," the plaintiff's number, so
that when the plaintiff tried to call his home from his office he was
informed that his phone had been disconnected on account of
14I42 U. S. 386 (1892).
"191 U. S. 207 (903).

"77 Wash. 205, 137 Pa. 496 (1913), 5I L. R. A. (N. S.) 686.
l216 S. V. 403 (Tex. I919).
2Carmichael v. Bell Telephone Co., 157 N. C. 21, 72 S. E. 619 (1911);
Harbaugh v. Citizens' Telephone Co., igo Mich. 421, 157 N. W. 32 (1916);
Sommerville v. Chesapeake & Potcmac Telephone Co., 258 Fed. 147 (1919).
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non-payment of the bill. He then appealed from the operator
to the cashier and to the manager, who refused to accept his word
that he had paid the bill, and told him to bring his receipt to the
office. He was too busy to do so, and was therefore unable to
talk to his wife until the defendant's agents discovered the error
and reconnected the phone an hour later.
There is, however, no evidence that the plaintiff sustained
any loss or damage by reason of not being able to talk to his wife.
It is not even averred that he went to the trouble of sending a
message to her by some other means. The injury that he complained of was not the loss of the phone service for a short time,
but the insult, as he conceived it, of being told that he had not
paid his bill, and of having his word doubted when he said that
he had. As stated in the plaintiff's own testimony: "The fact
that they told me I had not paid the bill was an insult to me.
,* *It
certainly did ruffle my feelings; the cashier spoke
so sarcastic and cold-blooded." The plaintiff sought and obtained redress, not for the infringement of his contractual right
to uninterrupted phone service, but for the injury to his temper
caused by the attitude of the cashier.
If the wounding of pride is to be made the basis for recovery
in a tort action, even if confined to cases where the offending
party is in privity of contract with the plaintiff, to what lengths
may not the law go? The rent of the telephone for the time it
was disconnected was computed at twenty cents, and this amount
was tendered by the defendant as damages for the admitted breach
of the contract.
In the case of Cumberland Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Hobart3 chiefly relied on by the majority of the Court, a verdict of
$I5O for annoyance and inconvenience was upheld, when the
defendant wrongfully disconnected the plaintiff's phone. But this
case falls far short of supporting the decision of the principal
case. The phone had been disconnected, noiL by a mistake, but
for the wrongful purpose of coercing the plaintiff into paying a
bill for another phone which was rented by his wife. It was
disconnected for three or four months, and the plaintiff was subjected to the real and tangible inconvenience of walking or hiring
a messenger for his errands which otherwise would have been
accomplished by telephone, and not merely to the subjective
annoyance of losing his temper and feeling chagrined.
On the other hand, in the case of Cumberland Telegraph &
Telephone Co. v. Hendon,4 where a mistake of the bookkeeper
caused the defendant to disconnect the plaintiff's phone for a
space of eighteen hours, there being no proof of pecuniary loss
but considerable real inconvenience, the plaintiff being a physician,
a verdict of $200 was set aside and the case remanded with inMiss. 252, 42 So. 349 (19o6).
114 Ky. 501, 71 S. W. 435 (1903).

'89
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structions that the plaintiff was entitled only to the proportionate
lost.
.amount of the rent of the telephone for the time its use was
'So in Jenkins v. Southern Bell Telegraph & Telephone Co. 5 a verdict of thirty cents was sustained as not inadequate, on appeal
by the plaintiff, where the defendant through a misunderstanding
of a remark made by the plaintiff removed the phone from the
plaintiff's house, there being no evidence of special damage. So
also it has been held that exemplary or punitive damages cannot
be awarded against a telephone company for removing a subunless shown that the removal was an intenscriber's telephone
tional wrong.8
The Court in the majority opinion confessed that they were
"laboring under some doubt as to the correctness of their conclusions." There was no room here for exemplary damages, nor
was the claim put on that ground, since the defendant's wrongful
act was due to a mistake. The error in allowing the $250 as
compensatory damages is not that damages are not recoverable
for annoyance and inconvenience, for the weight of authority
and even the dissenting opinion hold that they are so recoverable,
but that the evidence in this case shows no appreciable annoyance
and inconvenience caused by the disconnecting of the plaintiff's
phone. What the decision really does, then, is to allow recovery
for the annoyance caused by the rude manner of the defendant's
agents. To establish such a doctrine as this would mean to open
the door to damage suits for an infinite variety of intangible grievances and "insults" which have heretofore been considered of
too small importance to be settled in a court of law.
E. C. L.
RIGHT

TO TRIAL BY JURY IN WILL CASES UNDER THE PENN-

.SYLVANIA CONSTITUTION.-The question as to the right to trial

by jury in will cases under the Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania has been raised in that jurisdiction by a recent case,
Fleming's Estate,' in which a vigorous dissenting opinion maintained that there is such a right, at least to determine whether
the signature is true or forged.
In 1832, the Pennsylvania legislature provided that the court
shall grant an issue for determination of the question by a jury
"whenever a dispute upon a matter of fact arises before any register's. [orphans'] court. ' ' 2 This statute has been interpreted by
.along series of cases to mean "a substantial dispute upon a material
57 Ga.App. 484, 67 S. E. 124 (1910).
8Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Baker, 85 Miss. 486, 37 So.
1012 (19o4); Horsfield v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., IOI Kan. 481,
168 Pac. 316 (1917).
'Fleming's Estate, 265 Pa. 399 (91g).
2Act March 15, 1832, Sec. 41, P. L. r46; 4 Purd. Dig. 4088. This act

'has been included with slight verbal changes in the codification of the Law of
Decedents' Estates as Section 21 (b) of the Orphans' Court Act (Act June 7,
1917, P. L. 363).
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matter of fact," and the method adopted for deciding whether
the dispute is substantial is that the issue will be granted only
when a verdict of the jury for the party demanding the issue would
not be set aside as against the evidence. 3 In the recent case
mentioned above 4 the Orphans' Court declined to grant an issue
to the proponent of the will to determine the validity of the signature, because under the evidence a verdict that the signature,
was valid must be set aside. The refusal was affirmed by the,
Supreme Court, which held that the Act of 1832, even as interpreted, deprived no one of a constitutional right to a trial by jury..
The question of its constitutionality seems not to have been raised
in any of the many previous cases.
The first constitutional provision in Pennsylvania as to theright of trial by jury is contained in the Constitution of 1776 in
See. ii of Chapter I, the "Declaration of Rights,"-"That in
controversies respecting property and in suits between man and
man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be
held sacred," and in Sec. 25, Chapter II, "Plan or Frame of Government,"-"Trials shall be by jury as heretofore." The Constitution of 179o, Article IX, Sec. 6, provided that "Trial by
jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate."
The Supreme Court of the State has held that the effect of the,
provisions of these two Constitutions has been to preserve to
the citizens the right of trial by jury wherever it existed under
the law of England and of Pennsylvania prior to the Constitution
of I776.5 The Constitutions of 1838 and 1874 contain the same,
clause as that of 179o. Thus there can be no constitutional right
to trial by jury today in a will case, even to test the validity of
the signature, unless that right existed before the adoption of
the first State Constitution.
In England before the American Revolution all wills dealing
with personalty ("testaments") were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. 6 The law courts had no jurisdiction whatsoever. Courts of Chancery in certain cases might
take action in respect to the enforcement of such wills after probate, and might frame an issue for trial before a jury, but the
verdict would not be binding upon the Chancellor. 7 Wills dealing
with real property, on the other hand, were at first not probated
3
Cozzen's Will, 61 Pa. 196 (1869); De Haven's Appeal, 75 Pa. 337 (1874);
Schwilke's Appeal, ioO Pa. 628 (1882); Knauss' Appeal, 114 Pa. iO (1886);
Sharpless' Estate, 134 Pa. 250, i9 AtI. 63o (189o); Conway's Estate, 257 Pa.
314, oi Atl. 652 (1917).
4Fleming's Estate, supra.
5Van Swartow v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa. 131 (1854); Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89 (1862); Smith v. Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa. 481, 521
(1897).
'Andrews v. Powys, 2 Bro. P. C. 5o4 (Eng. 1723); Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk.
324 (Eng. 1742); Barnesly v. Powel, i Ves. Sen. 284 (Eng. 1749), in which the
question
7 of a forged signature was squarely raised.
Barnesly v. Powel, supra.
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at all. Later they were probated by the ecclesiastical courts,
but the probate was not conclusive if the heir brought a common
law action of ejectment to recover the lands.8 Each devisee was
required to make out his title in a new cause, establishing the will
each time. And even in a will devising lands, if the action was
brought in equity, the granting of an issue devisavit vel non was
-a matter of discretion and not an absolute right.O
The probate law of the province of Pennsylvania differed
but little from that of England. Registers had been provided to
'replace the ecclesiastical courts and to probate all wills, both of
personalty and of realty." By the Constitution of 179o Regis-2
ter's Courts were established to hear appeals from probate.1
These courts, whose jurisdiction was later given to the Orphans'
Court, 13 exercised the powers of the old ecclesiastical courts in
'regard to appeals from probate. But the granting of an issue
by the register prior to the first constitution was no more a matter
of absolute right than in the ecclesiastical and equity courts of
England, and no distinction seems to have been made in the probate between forgery or fraud of any character, just as no distinction was made in the ecclesiastical courts.14 Probate of wills
of personalty was conclusive except for a direct appeal. 15 But
probated wills devising land were subject in the province as in
England to be defeated in the collateral action of ejectment, where
the probate was only prima facie evidence of the validity of the
will.16 This right to bring ejectment, though it allowed the heir
to have a jury pass upon a will of realty, was in no sense a right
to have granted on the probating of a will an issue as to its va'lidity. It was rather a right to bring an entirely different action,
and was abolished by the legislature in Pennsylvania in 1856.17
Although there has not been entire harmony in the decisions,
due in part to different provincial statutes, it has been held in a
majority of states that no absolute right to trial by jury in will
-cases existed prior to the adoption of the State Constitution.'&
Netter v. Brett, Cro. Car. 395 (Eng. 1638); Sir Richard Raine's case,
i Ld. 9Raym. 262 (Eng. 1697).
Netter v. Brett, supra.
10Hampden v. Hampden, 3 Bro. P. C. 551 (Eng. 1709); Woodruff v.
'Wood, Dick. 32 (Eng. 1719); Cowgill v. Rhodes, 33 Beav. 310 (Eng. 1863).
"Act 1700, I Sm. Laws, Chap. 43; Act. 1705, I Sm. Laws, Chap. 133;
Act June 7, 1712, I Sm. Laws, Chap. 187; Rowland v. Evans, 6 Pa. 435 (1847).
"2Art. V, Sec. 7, Constitution of 179o and Act April 13, 1791, I Sm. Laws
,Chap. 1564. See notes i Sm. Laws, pages 36 and 137.
"3Art V, Sec. 32, Constitution of 1874.
"4McKean, J. at page 9o in Walmesley's Lessee v. Read, i Yeates 87
.(Pa. 1791); Barnesly v. Powel, supra.
15Coates v, Hughes, 3 Binney 498, 5o6 (Pa. 1811); Logan v. Watt, 5 S.
& R. 212 (Pa. 1819).
"6Weston v. Stammers, I Dallas 2 (Pa. 1759); Walmesley's Lessee v.
Read, supra, and case of Cook v. Brown cited therein by Justice Yeates; Smith
v. Bonsall, 5 Rawle 8o (Pa. 1832).
"7Act, April 22, 1856, Sec. 7, P. L. 533.
"8Davis v. Davis, 123 Mass. 590 (1878); Moody v. Found, 208 Ill. 78,
-69 N. E. 831 (1904); 15 Ann. Cas. 21r, note.
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In some states, however, the opposite conclusion has been reached, 19
while in others20 the right has been given by the Constitution itself
or by Statute.
An interesting point as to the constitutionality of the interpretation given to the Act of 1832 was not touched upon by the
majority or by the dissenting justice in Fleming's Estate, supra.
For even if there were a constitutional right to trial by jury to
determine the validity of the signature to a will, as contended in
the dissenting opinion, the refusal of the judge to allow the question to go to a jury when a verdict for one party must at once
be set aside, would seem no more of an encroachment upon that
right than would the giving of binding instructions or the granting
of judgment non obstante veredicto, both of which are in common
practice in Pennsylvania. It is true that the United States Supreme Court held in 1912 that the Pennsylvania act providing
for granting judgment n. o. v. was opposed to the Seventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which guarantees "trial by
jury as heretofore" in the Federal Courts, and held further that
the practice must not be followed in the Federal Courts in Pennsylvania.1 But the practice has been held constitutional in the
Pennsylvania State Courts under the State Constitution, even
after the United States Supreme Court's decision.22 The reasons
in favor of upholding that statute-simplification of procedure
and elimination of waste motion-would apply just as strongly
to the interpretation of the Act of 1832 on the question of granting an issue in will cases, even if there were such a constitutional
right to trial by jury as the dissenting opinion contends.2 3 For
what useful purpose is served in forcing a matter to go to a jury

if a verdict of the jury for him who demands the issue must necessarily be set aside?21
R.D.
NATURE OF THE SERVICES OF A FLAGMAN AT A CROSSING
UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT.-The question,

as to whether or not an employee of a railroad is engaged in inter19
Cockrill v. Cox, 65 Tex. 669 (1886); Corley v. McElmeel, 149 N. Y.
228, 237, 43 N. E. 628 (1896).
20Cases
collected in note, x5 Ann. Cas. 212.
2
1SloCum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1912); Pedersen v. D. L.
& W. 22R. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146 (1913).
Dalmas v. Kemble, 215 Pa. 410 (19o6); Stryker v. Montoursville Borough, 57 Pa. S. C. 100 (1914); American W. & V. Co. v. Fayette L. Co., 57 Pa.
(1914).
S. C. 6o8
23
See opinion of Justice Mitchell in Dalmas v. Kemble, supra, and dissenting opinion of Justice Hughes in Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra, for a full
discussion
of the merits of granting judgment non obstante veredicto.
24
Pennsylvania is at present in the throes of drafting a new constitution
to replace that of 1874. The Committee appointed by Governor Sproul has
drawn up for consideration a tentative draft, which repeats the former clause,
"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore." The addition of a few sentences would
settle several disputed questions and decisions, and especially would end the
apparent conflict in constitutional interpretation of the same words between,
the United States and the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts.
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state commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employer's
Liability Act has raised many interesting questions and has been
the subject of many decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Act provides "that every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in commerce between any of the several
states, . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce."'
It therefore must be proven not only that the common carrier
the employee
is engaged in interstate commerce, but also that
2
at the time of the accident was also so engaged.
There are several broad principles laid down by which the
nature of the employment is to be tested. In the first place,
"the particular service being performed at the time of the injury"
is to be "isolatedly considered" ;3 and what the employee has done
before or expects to do immediately afterwards is immaterial.'
The work must be "a part of the interstate commerce in which
the carrier is engaged," 5 or by a stricter test laid down by Mr.
Justice Lamar, when this test was found to be too vague, the work
must be "so directly and immediately connected with such business
as substantially to form a part or necessary incident thereof."6
There is a distinct tendency to ascribe to a service, wherever
possible, the nature of any specific traffic movement which it
may expedite, either by way of immediate preparation for such
movement, 7 or actual participation therein. 8 The reason for such
a tendency is that a traffic movement being either interstate or
intrastate commerce, to identify the employee with such a movement is to make him a "substantial and necessary part" of that
particular act of commerce. The connection between the service and the commerce is simple and direct. In these cases the
important factor is not whether the employee is identified with a
certain car, engine or train engaged in interstate or intrastate
commerce, but whether or not he is expediting a particular interstate traffic movement. 9 However, it is not enough that the
indirect, remote and problematical consequences of the improper
'Sec. I, Act of April 22nd, 19o8, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149.
'Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I, 55 (1912); Pedersen v.
Del. Lack. & West R. R., 229 U. S.146 (913); III. Cent, R. R. v. Behrens,
233 U. S.473 (1914); Tilliv. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., 263 Pa. 558, 107 AtI. 330
(I919)'I11. Cent. R. R. v. Behrens,
supra.
4Erie R. R. v. Welsh, 242 U. S.303 (1916); McBain v. No. Pac. R. R.,
52 Mont. 578, 16o Pac. 654 (1916).
5
VanDevanter, J., in Pedersen's case, supra, p. 152.
76N. Y. Central R. R. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 260, 264 (1915).
North Carolina R. R. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 249, 26o (1914); Armbruster
v. Chi. R. I. & P. R. R., 166 Iowa 155, 147 N. W. 337 (1914).
8N. Y. Central R. R. v. Carr, supra; Pennsylvania Co. v. Donat, 239 U. S.
5o (1915); Murray v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R., 263 Pa. 298, (1919).
sLouisville & N. R. R. v. Parker, 242 U. S. 13 (1916); Southern Ry. Co. v.
Puckett, 244 U. S.571 (1917); Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Barlow, 244 U. S.183,
(917); So. Pac. R. R. v. Ind.Acc. Com., 178 Pac. 7o6 Pac. (Cal. 1919).
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performance of the services may ultimately affect the interstate
traffic of the railroad. 10 The connection between the services
and the traffic movement must be direct and immediate.," These
rules are applied not only where the services are the preparation
or operation of a traffic movement, but also where they look to
the safety of such a movement and protect it. Thus the services
of a car inspector derive their interstate or intrastate nature from
the character of the traffic movement in which the cars he is
inspecting are engaged,'? and the services of a watchman over
freight cars resting in a yard from the character of the journey
which such cars are making. 3
Where it is impossible to connect the services with any particular traffic movement, a more general test has had to be resorted
to. Where an employee is injured returning from his day's work,
whether or not he is engaged in interstate commerce depends
upon the character of his day's work, taken as a whole, and where
such work had been the switching of both interstate and intrastate freight, the employee was held to be engaged in interstate
commerce. 14 Where the work consists in the maintenance and
repair of the instrumentalities of commerce as contrasted with
their use in a particular traffic movement, if they are such instrumentalities as cars or engines, the services are not regarded as
interstate"5 unless it is shown that such car or engine is exclusively
used in interstate commerce."6 However, if the instrumentality
is the road bed and its appurtenances, the rule is that such services are interstate in character provided such roadbed is used
by interstate traffic, although also used for intrastate traffic. 7
Acts in immediate preparation of or incident to the repair are
included in the term "repair.""' This rule, annunciated in Pedersen's case by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, has been applied in cases
of clearing wrecks," 9 in the case of an employee shovelling snow
from the tracks, 0 and in the case of a cook cooking for a construction gang repairing an interstate bridge. 2" The Supreme Court
10111. Central R. R. v. Behrens, supra; Shanks v. Del. Lack. & West R. R.,
241 U.S. 177 (1916).
"N. Y. Central R. R. v. Carr, supra.
"2Boyle v. Penna. R. R., 228 Fed. 266 (1916); Lynch's Admr. v. Cent.
Vt. R. R., 89 Vt. 363, 95 Atl. 683 (1916).
"3Chi., R. I. & P. R. R. v. Ind. Board., 273 I11.
528, 113 N. E. 8o (1916).
"Hinson's v. Atlanta & Air Line R. R., 172 N. C. 646, 9o S.E. 772 (1916);
239 U. S. 556 (1916); Chi. B. & Q. R. R. v. Harrignton,

Erie R. R. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170 (1917); Ewig v. Chi, M. & St. P. R. R.,
167 Wis. 597, 167 N. W. 442 (1918).
15Minn. & St. L. R. R. v. Winters, 242 U. S.353 (1917).
"Smigiel
v. Gt. Northern R. R., z65 Wis. 67, 16o N. W. 1057 (1917).
7

' Pedersen v. Del. Lack. & West. R. R., supra; Denver & R. G. R. R. v.

Wilson, 62 Colo. 492, 163 Pac. 857 (1917).
sPedersen v. Del. Lack. & West. R. R. supra; Godley v. Wilson,
Ill. App. 612 (1918).
"Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, supra.
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2"N. Y. Central R. R. v. Porter, 249 U. S. 168 (1919); Koofis v. Gt. Northern R. R., 17o N. W. 859 (N. D. 2919).
"1Phila., B. & W. R. R. v. Smith, 250 U. S.10I (1919).
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has refused to extend it to the repair of a depot used in interstate
commerce,22 and to the repair of an engine ue-!d indiscriminently
for either interstate or intrastate commerce. 2, It is not applied
to the case of the construction
of a road bed, destined to be used
24
in interstate commerce.
What is the proper test to be applied to the case of a flag:man at a crossing is an interesting question which has not yet
been decided by the United States Supreme Court. It will be
admitted that his primary duty is to warn those using the intersecting highway of the approach of traffic upon the railway, and
in other ways afford that protection which the railroad is bound
to give the public where its rails cross the public highway. Were
this view alone taken of his services it is plain that he would be
engaged in neither interstate nor intrastate commerce. 25 The
majority of cases, however, attach importance to the secondary
duties which the flagman owes to the railroad, and there is a direct
conflict of opinion as to whether such secondary duty consists
in flagging each individual train in order to inform it whether
or not it may safely cross, or whether it consists in protecting
the roadbed from physical harm resulting from possible collisions
with heavy vehicles using the crossing. It will be noted that the
split in opinion involves the classification of such services either
as part of a traffic movement or as the maintenance and repair
of the roadbed.
The former view was taken in a recent case decided by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 6 which regarded the flagman as
a species of traffic policeman, who not only has the power to stop
the traffic upon the highway but also that upon the railroad if
necessary. In so far as these services affect the traffic upon the
railroad they are for the protection of each particular train, and
are in this respect similar to the services of a car inspector,27 or
any member of the crew of the train, the proper performance of
whose duties is necessary to its safety. The flagman is in effect
co6perating with the engineer of the train to prevent collisions.
In short the Pennsylvania case holds that the services of the flagman drive their nature from the traffic movement he is in the act
of protecting.
The latter view was taken by the Supreme Court of Californian in an opinion based squarely upon Pedersen's case, extend22

Nash v. Minn. & St. L. R. R.,

I66,

242

U. S. 61g (1917), reversing 131 Minn.

154 N. W. 957 (1915).

23 B. & 0. R. R. v. Branson, 242 U. S. 623 (1917), reversing
98 At.24 225 (igi6).
Raymond v. Chi., M. & St. P. R. R., 243 U. S. 43 (1917).
2

Louisville & N. R. R. v. Barrett, 143 Ga. 742, 85 S. E.

26

DiDonato v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co.,-Pa.-(192o).
At. Coast
Line R. R., 174 N. C. 125, 93 S. E. 479 (1917).
27
supra 12.
2

128

Md. 678.

923 (1915).

Accord; West v.

8Southern Pac. Co. v. Ind Acc. Com. of Cal., r74 Cal. 8, 161 Pac. 1139
9o N. J. L. 450, 1o Ati. 1034
.(1917); Chi. & A. R. R. v. Ind. Com., 124 N. E. 344 (Ill. 1919), annotated, 68
U. of Pa. Law Review 196.

{igi6).Accord; Flynn v. N. Y., S. & W. Ry. Co.,
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ing the rule in that case to services which protect the roadbed from
injury. Stress is laid upon the recent extensive use of heavy
motor trucks and the serious effect to the roadbed which would
undoubtedly result from a collision between such a truck and a
train, i. e., the derailing of the train and the putting out of commission of all the tracks.
There are three reasons why this latter view is less acceptable than that taken by the Pennsylvania Court. In the first
place, the possibility that the tracks will be damaged by an improper performance of the services is so problematical and remote
that it can hardly be said to be "so directly and immediately connected" with the interstate business of maintaining the roadbed
"as to substantially form a part or necessary incident thereof. '"29
In the second place, in extending the rule in Pedersen's case to
the protection, as well as to the repair and maintenance of the
roadbed, the California court has broadened the scope of a rule
which the United States Supreme Court has been apt to restrict. 0
In the third place, the tendency in the cases has been to identify
the services with a particular traffic movement wherever possible,
and it has only been in those cases where the services could not
be conveniently so classified, that the more general tests have
been applied.
The view of the Pennsylvania Court would seem to be the
sounder. When the flagman's services are interpreted as being
for the purpose of piloting each particular train over the crossing
and in that way protecting it from the danger of collision, there
is no difficulty in holding that such services are "so directly and
immediately connected with" a particular traffic movement "as
to substantially form a part or necessary incident thereto." It
does not matter that the nature of these services may change
with each passing train, for the determining factor is the work
in hand "considered isolatedly."31 Furthermore, in seeking the
character of the duty which the flagman owes to the railroad, by
which the nature of his services are to be determined, it is more
reasonable to regard that duty as being the immediate protection
of each train, than as being the possible and problematical protection of the roadbed from damage which would result from a
collision with an especially heavy vehicle.
Another point which is of great practical importance was
decided in the Pennsylvania case; 32 namely, that where the defendant claims the benefit of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, the burden of proof is upon him to establish the interstate
nature of the employee's services at the time of the injury. Although this question has not been decided by the United States
aLamar, J.'s rule, N. Y. Central R. R. v. Carr, supra.
oSupra 22 & 23.
"Ill.
Central R. R. v. Behrens, supra; Erie R. R. v. Welsh, supra.
32
DiDonato v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., supra.

3
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Supreme Court, the great weight of authority is in accord with
this view. 3 In cases of accidents upon railroads the State courts
have general jurisdiction. The States have conceded to the
Federal Government, and Congress has legislated upon only so
much of that jurisdiction as pertains to interstate commerce.
It follows that he who would take a case out of a general field
into a restricted one has the burden of proof. Furthermore, to
put the burden in this case upon the plaintiff would place upon
him the impossible burden of proving a negative with no facilities
for collecting data, since the facts necessary to prove the inter.
state character of the train which the employee was flagging were
peculiarly within the knowledge of the railroad.
F. H. B., JR.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND "LAST CLEAR CHANCE."-

Three recent decisions raise again the question of how far the
doctrine of "last clear chance" will be extended in modification
of, or contravention to, the fundamental defense of contributory
negligence. Broadly stated this doctrine is, that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action for injury
by negligence, if it be shown that the defendant might by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence.1
In Tullock et al. v. Connecticut Co. 2 the plaintiff's intestate
and two others negligently stopped their truck at night, close
to the defendant company's inter-urban tracks, and proceeded to
change a back tire. They worked between the truck and tracks,
just off the highway, though a few feet further was a place of
safety. The negligence of the defendant's motorman was lack
of proper vigilance, which would have disclosed the situation
in time to avoid injury to the intestate. The negligence of the
intestate, in taking and keeping his dangerous position without
precautions against danger, was not allowed to defeat the action.
In Gunter's Adm'r v. Southern Ry. Co.3 the same result was
reached. The intestate, whom the court considered a licensee
on the tracks of the defendant, was walking in the evening, absorbed in "hand-holding and rollicking," along a path between
the rails. She was observed by the defendant's engineer, who
negligently gave no warning. The injury was held actionable
on the ground that the engineer, after discovering the intestate's
peril, owed the duty to avoid injury irrespective of her antecedent
33
Erie Railroad v. Welsh, 89 Ohio 81, 105 N. E. 189 (1913); Chi., R. I.
&P. R. R. v. McBee, 45 Okl. 192, 145 Pac. 331 (1914);Zavistowskyv. Chi. M &
St. P. R. R., I6I Wis. 461, 154 N. W., 954 (1915); Chi. R. I., & P. R. R. v. Ind.
Board of Ill., 273 Ill. 528, 113 N. E. 8o (1916); Terry v. So. Pac. R. R., 34 Cal.
App. 330, 169 Pac. 86 (1917); Contra: Links v. Erie R. R., 91 N. J. L. 166, io3
Atl. 176
(1918).
1
Burdick, Torts 491 (3rd Ed.).

56 (Conn. 1919).
(Va. 1920).
3ioi S. E. 885
2io8 At.
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negligence. This decision is in accord with the strictest interpretation of the "last clear chance" doctrine. Indeed, afterdiscovery of the peril, the defendant's failure to avoid injury,
4 when
he could reasonably have done so, approaches wantonness.
In the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith's Adm'rs5 there
was evidence that the intestate was run over at night by the defendant's train, backing without sufficient care, while he was
sitting or lying on the tracks near a path, not an authorized crossing, but in constant use as such. The intestate was evidently
intoxicated. The court held that there was a duty on the railroad to look out for the intestate if he were using the path as a
footway, since then he was a licensee; and that the correct instruction to the jury was that if he were sitting or lying on the track,
being a trespasser, there could be no recovery without showing
that he was seen by the trainmen in time to avoid the accident.
The theory of this instruction as given by the court is that having
abused the "permissive license" the intestate became a trespasser
to whom no duty of care was owed. It is submitted, however,
that though the "last clear chance" doctrine is not mentioned,
the case is contra in principle if not on its facts to Tullock v. Conn.
Co., supra.
The general doctrine has been announced in various forms,
the most logical of which requires that the negligence of the defendant be subsequent, in point of operation at least, to the negligent act of the injured party, and that the defendant be capable
of observing the event and the helpless peril of the injured party,
whereby the burden is thrown upon him to avoid the situation.
Where these elements are present and the defendant has actually
seen the injured party, as in Gunter's Adm'r v. Southern Ry., supra,
6
he is generally held answerable.
When, however, as in Tullock v. Conn. Co., the negligent
acts of both are those of inattention merely, or negligent absorption preventing observation, in a situation which requires vigilance
from both, it would seem that, if both persist in inattention, the
negligence of each is of the same sort and concurrently operating
up to the moment of impact, and, therefore, the defendant should
not be answerable.7 In some jurisdictions, however, notably
Missouri, the rule has blossomed into the so-called "humanitarian" doctrine. This allows recovery when both parties had
equal capabilities and facilities of observation, though neither
did in fact see the danger, and though the negligence of the injured
party had not ceased before the intervention of the defendant's
negligence. 8
4Little Rock R. & E. Co. v. Billings, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1035 (note).
5216 S. W. ro63 (Ky. 1919).
OCavanaugh v. Boiton & Maine Railroad, 76 N. H. 68, 79 AtI. 694
(I9II);7 Tavis v. Bush, 217 S. W. 274 (Mo. 1920).
Neal v. Carolina Central Railroad Co., 126 N. C. 639, 36 S. E. 117 (1900).
'Morgan v. Wabash Railroad Co., 159 Mo. 262, 6o S. W. 195 (1900).
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To account, therefore, for the rule as followed in Tullock v.
Conn. Co., and this extension of it, does not seem feasible on the
usual legal principles of contributory negligence. It is submitted
that the result, if not the basis, of the rule is this: that upon a
person engaged in operating an instrument of such inherent danger
as a steam engine, a greater quantum of care is imposed by law
to guard against injury, even to those upon his property without
right, than is required of a man to care for his own safety upon
the obviously dangerous property of another.
No distinction is usually made between the case in which
the injured party continues to act in a situation, oblivious to his
danger and one in which, having placed himself negligently in a
perilous position, he remains absorbed or unconscious. In both
cases recovery is allowed, his negligence being considered a preexistent rather than a concurrent cause of the accident. Some
few cases, however, draw a distinction between moving absorbedly into a danger zone, and remaining in it, allowing recovery
only in the latter case. 9 It is difficult to see how any real distinction can be made on the test of motion, especially since some
courts deny recovery in both cases.
In some jurisdictions, even those most liberal to the negligent plaintiff, a righteous horror has stayed the hand in giving
relief when intoxication was the cause of his being in peril,"0 though
favoring one in the same situation if his unconsciousness was
due to some other cause, such as fits. It is submitted that this
element of immorality should not have judicial weight, since
logically and legally such conduct is mere negligence and the man,
after his negligent act and before the intervention of the defendant's negligence, is certainly helpless." To punish him or his
widow by such extra-statutory method seems unreasonable. Thus
the plaintiff's position in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith
should be stronger than in Tullock v. Conn. Co., for in the former
his position was helpless prior to the impact, whereas in the latter
having capabilities of alertness he did not use them.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith without mentioning the doctrine of last clear chance denies recovery on the ground that the
intestate was a trespasser and, therefore, that the defendant
owed him no duty until discovery, though if he had been walking
across the track, the R. R. would have had a duty to look out for
him. In that case no express license had ever been granted to
use the place as a crossing, but the court calls the intestate a
licensee because of the unchecked use by the public of the tracks
at that point. It is submitted that the term licensee or "per9
Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 1o9, 84 Atl. 301 (1912). But see
dissenting
opinion.
10
Smith v. Norfolk & Southern Railroad Company, 114 N. C. 728 (x894);
The H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Symkins, 54 Tex. 615 (188i).
"Edgerly v. Ry. Co., 67 N. H. 312, 36 Atl. 558 (1892); Bohlen: Essays
on Torts, 256.
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missive" licensee is unfortunate, as implying a real license, whereas
a more accurate analysis of the situation is that the frequency of
user, known to the railroad's agents, creates such a danger to
the public that the burden of care thrown upon the railroad is
similar to that at an authorized crossing.
W. E. M., JR.
CAPACITY TO CONTRACT IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw.It is the purpose of this note to consider the capacity of parties
to make contracts in regard to movables where there is a conflict
of laws raised as to which is the proper law to determine this
capacity. This problem arises whenever the contract is of such
a nature that the law of more than one jurisdiction may possibly
be involved. The authorities indicate that there are five possible
solutions of the problem according to present private international
law rules, of which four only have been adopted in the United
States with a marked tendency to reduce this number to three.
These five solutions are the lex patriae, the lex domicilii, the lex
celebratonis (usually termed the lex loci contractus), the lex solutionis, and the law contemplated by the parties as the proper law
to govern. This last solution is usually termed the "Intention of
the Parties Rule." Each of these solutions is in general ardently
supported by the jurisdiction adopting it by reason of peculiar
local conditions or nationalistic characteristics. For example, the
lex patriae rule is, in general, in force in continental countries,
where nationalistic sentiment is strong and where public thought
is opposed to the casting off of the rights and duties of citizenship
by a mere change of residence no matter how permanent in character. This rule is, however, obviously impractical in federated
states such as Great Britain, Germany and the United States.
In England the lex domicilii rule appears to have been the test
of capacity to contract,2 with the exception possibly of commercial
contracts., Whether this statement is strictly accurate today is
doubtful, as the modern tendency of English decisions is to treat
all matters relating to contracts as governed by the law that the
parties had in contemplation in making the contract.4 No case
has been found where this doctrine was specifically applied to a
question of capacity except one,5 where a party suffering under

'Asser; Droit International Priv6, 56; Baty: Polarized Law, 3o.
2Dicey: Conflict of Laws, 2nd Ed. 534, 538; LaFleur: Conflict of Laws in
the Province of Quebec, 67; Cooper v. Cooper, r3 App. Cases 88 (Eng. 1888).
3Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163 (Eng. 18oo); Sottomayor v. DeBarros, 5
P. D. 94
(Eng. 1879).
4
Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery Co., (1894) A. C. 202; South African
Breweries Co. v. King, 2 Ch. 173 (Eng. x899).
"The intention as to which law should govern is to be found by preferring
the law of the place with which the transaction has the most real connection."
"The fact that the contract may be partially or wholly invalid under one
of the laws that might possibly apply is relevant in finding the intention but not
conclusive."

'Ogden v. Ogden (19o8) P. 46.
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an incapacity to marry by the law of his domicile, France, was
nevertheless deemed validly married after a marriage ceremony
in England in full compliance with the English marriage laws.
From the language of the court in this case it is difficult to discover
whether the decision is based on the intent of the parties' doctrine
flatly or on a concept of the French law that the incapacity stated
amounted merely to a formality rather than a true incapacity
to contract. If this tendency of the English courts develops so
that the Intent Rule applies to the capacity to contract, as is
thought by several modern English authorities, it seems justly
subject to the criticism of Westlake6 that it may be precisely the
lawfulness of the parties' intention which is in dispute and that
this question should not be solved by reference to the intention
itself.
The lex loci contractus, the lex solutionis, and the Intention
of the Parties rules are all supported in the United States with
a decided tendency to favor the last,7 though a few technicians
object vehemently to its application to any case where the legality
of the parties' intention is in issue. 8 The argument advanced
against the Intention Rule seems to be that the intention of the
parties is used to select some local law; that the local law, thus
selected, is then applied to determine the capacity of the parties
to form a legally efficacious intent, and that therefore such a rule
uses the intention to select a law by which to decide the legal
existence of this very intention. In short the opponents of the
Intention Rule accuse the proponents thereof of reasoning in a
circle. The argument of the proponents in answer appears to
be that it is possible to form a conclusion as to the general wishes
of the parties without regard to the possible partial or complete
illegality thereof and then to test the specific legality of the contract in controversy by the law thus selected. One English text
writer states that the English courts, in adopting the Intention
Rule, merely arrive at the result of always applying English law.9
He further indicates that the cases show a strong tendency to
find that the parties always desire to do honor to the law of England by selecting it as the law of their choice.IO This destructive
criticism, of course, only goes to the faulty application of the rule
and not to the merits of the rule itself except to indicate that it
is possessed of inherent dangers that are apt to effectuate prejudice
in its application. This author appears to condemn the English
6

Private International Law, Sect. 211.
7Pritchard v. Norton 106 U. S. 124 (1882); Mayer v. Roche 77 N. J. L.
681, 75 Atl. 235 (19o9); Basilea v. Spagnuolo, 8o N. J. L. 88, 77 Atl. 531 (1910);
Fisk Rubber Co. v. Muller, 42 App. D. C. 49 (1914); Poole v. Perkins, ioi S. E.
240

(Va.
I919).
8

Baty: Polarized Law, 43; Raleigh C. Minor, "Conflict of Laws, " Sect.
72; note 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 763; note 1916A L. R. A. lO56; Campbell v.
Crampton, 2 Fed. 417 (188o); Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill.
230, lO6 N. E. 206 (1914).
9Baty:
Polarized Law, 46.
10
Hansen v. Dixon, 23 T. L. R. 56 (Eng. 19o6).
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courts not only for their faulty application of the Intention Rule
but also for the adoption of the rule itself, as he claims that the
policy of giving complete freedom to the intention of the parties
in contractual questions is wholly a creature of the English law,
and that therefore the courts of England are in effect merely
applying English law instead of international law to a truly international law problem. It would seem that this argument is at
fault in not appreciating the difference between a declaration of
what the local law of a country is and a declaration of the local
interpretation of the true international law rule. The argument
assumes that, because none of the courts that have applied international law in the past have expressed the rule in this form, it
cannot be a true rule of international law, whereas it may in fact
be the logical product of the growth and development of this
law in the course of time with a due regard for the changing international conditions.
While the rule of applying the intention of the parties is
declared to be the tendency in the United States by several recent
opinions, the existing weight of authority is hopelessly divided
between the application of the lex loci contractus and the lex solutionis with perhaps a predominance in favor of the former. This
difference appears to have arisen by reason of an inaccurate comprehension of the decision in the leading American case of Milliken
v. Pratt." In this case the language of the court indicated in one
passage that the lex loci contractus governed and later placed
emphasis on the lex solutionis, both laws being the same under the
facts of the case. The authorities have, however, found it to
have been decided on one basis or the other depending, in all
probability, upon previously formed conclusions as to what the
true rule was. Minor cites it as authority for the lex loci contractus12 while Wharton classes it as authority for the lex somtionis rule. 3 In most of the American jurisdictions, the cases
are firmly in support of one or the other of these two solutions.-*
In New York, however, there appears to be a hopeless confusion
existing. In Bank v. Chapman"s the lex loci contractus was adopted
without reference to the earlier case of Thompson v. Ketcham"
which had flatly adopted the lex solutionis. Still later in Hammerstein v. Sylva, 17 the Supreme Court of New York upheld a
Mass. 374 (1878).
"2Conflict of Laws, Sect. 72.
"Conflict
of Laws, 222.
"4Lex loci contractus: Campbell v. Crampton, 2 Fed. 417 (388o); Hager
v. Bank, 105 Ga. I6, 31 S. E. 143 (1898); Lawler v. Lawler, 107 Ark. 70, 353
S. W. I133 (1913); Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230, 3o6 N. E. 206 (1914); Trust
Co. v. Knabe, 122 Md. 584, 39 At]. iio6 (3934). Lex solutionis: Thompson v.
Ketcham, 4 Johns. 285 (N. Y. 18o9); Robinson v. Queen, 87 Tenn. 445, I S. W.
38 (3889); Baum v. Birchall, i5o Pa. 364, 24 Atl. 620 (1892); Thompson v.
Taylor, 66 N. J. L. 253; 49, Atl. 544 (i9oi).
5169 N. Y. 538, 62 N. E. 672 (1902).
164 Johns. 285 (N. Y. 38o9).
1766 Misc. 550, 124 N. Y. S. 535 (1910).
11125

NOTES

contract against a married woman incapacitated by the lex loci
contractus but having capacity by the lex domicilli and the lex
solutionis. It was in an exactly parallel situation in England
that the English courts in desperation gave up any attempt at
reconciling the conflicting authorities and adopted the intention
of the parties' rule. It may be possible that the New York confusion will be similarly solved.
That such a solution will probably be the ultimate result
in the United States is rather forcefully illustrated in the most
recent judicial expression on the subject. 8 In this case the court
was called upon to determine the liability on a note made in Tennessee by a married woman domiciled there and lacking capacity,
and payable in Virginia where she had capacity to make the note.
After a careful examination of nearly all the American authorities
and a close argument on principle,the court upheld the validity of
the note, adopting the rule that the law contemplated by the
parties was the proper law to determine all questions relative to
the contract, other than formalities, and that in the absence of
express indication of the parties' intention, the law will presume
that the law of the place of performance was intended. This
conclusion, it should be noted, is somewhat different from the
present English understanding of the intention test, namely that
one should attempt to find the place with which the contract has
the most real connection and then presume that the law of this
place was the law contemplated by the parties. 4 It may be expected that under different facts this same court would weaken
this presumption and probably adopt the "most real connection
8
test." In Poole v. Perkins1
the law of the place of performance
sustained the contract and this fact was probably an important
factor in causing the court to state its conclusion in the way it
did. While in general the cases do not recognize this factor as
important, it may be observed by studying a series of cases in
any one jurisdiction that it is in fact always an element of highest
importance."
G.B.
RIGHT OF A SURETY TO AVOID CONTRACT BECAUSE OF DURESS

ON THE PRINCIPAL.-The right of a surety to avoid his contract
because of duress practiced on the principal is a much debated
question. The cases and the authorities are in decided conflict
upon this point. Although the conflict is well established, there
is much as yet unsaid which may help toward arriving at a more
satisfactory understanding of the problem.
When a surety pleads that his principal entered into the main
obligation under duress, a simple legal problem arises: is that
a sufficient plea for the surety? The answer has been given both
'8Poole v. Perkins, ioi S. E. 240 (Va. i919).
"Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. lO5 (1879); Liverpool etc. Co. v. Phenix Ins.
Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889); South African Breweries Co. v. King, supra.
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ways, with a variety of opinions between the extreme views. In
the early case of Huscombe v. Standing the court had little difficulty in deciding that duress on the principal was no defense
for the surety. Later cases decided that the surety could avoid
an obligation which his principal had entered into under duress,
on the ground that if he were compelled to pay, either he would
have no recourse against the principal, or the principal would have
to pay indirectly what he could not be forced to pay directly.
Either alternative would be equally unjust.2 But some cases
make this right of the surety to escape his contract depend on
the question of knowledge. If the surety had knowledge of the
duress of his principal when he became bound as surety, he is
said to have waived all right to defend on the ground of duress.3
Still other cases consider the relationship of the surety to the
principal, and hold that where certain degrees of relationship
exist between the surety and the principal, duress on the principal is duress.on the surety also and the surety
can defend a suit
4
by the creditor on the ground of the duress.
The standard text authorities are so confusing that they offer
little help on the subject, though they cite the different decisions
and attempt to deduce an all-embracing rule, which they state
in both positive 5 and negative 6 terms. In Childs' "Suretyship
and Guaranty"' 7 the law is stated as follows: "A surety will not
be bound if the principal executed the contract under duress,
unless the surety signed with knowledge thereof." According to
this statement of the law, to recover against a surety when his
principal has been subjected to duress, the creditor must prove
that the surety was aware of the duress when he assumed the
obligations of surety. In "Ruling Case Law," the following
statement is made: "It is the rule in a majority of the jurisdictions that duress to a principal will not avoid the obligation of
a surety if the latter at the time of executing the obligation knows
of the circumstances establishing the duress." From that point
of view it would seem that when a surety pleads duress of his
principal, the burden of proving his ignorance at the time he became surety rests upon him, that if he cannot prove his ignorance
of the fact of duress, the presumption will be in favor of the creditor. No attempt will be made to unravel these difficulties; they
are really questions of evidence and are merely referred to for the
purpose of showing the confusion which exists. For instance,
'Cro. Jac. 187 (Eng. I6o8).

2Coffelt v. Wise, 62 Ind. 451 (1878); Schuster v. Arena, 83 N. J. L. 79,
84 AtI. 725 (Z912).
3
Walton v. American Surety Co., 264 Pa. 272, 107 At. 725 (1919).
40wens v. Mynatt, i Heiskell, 675 (Tenn. 1870).
5

Spencer on Suretyship, § 57.
Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty, Third Ed. § 2 1.
'Childs, Suretyship and Guaranty, (1907) § 133.
$Ruling Case Law, Vol. 9. Duress, § 18.
6
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while the text authorities seem generally in favor of the view
that duress of the principal is no defense for the surety, especially
when he had knowledge of the duress, Brandt champions the
opposite view and says, "It has also been held, and it seems with
better reason, that the duress of the principal alone is a complete
defense to the surety'9 But he does not advance any arguinents in favor of his position, relying solely upon the cases which
he cites.
Cases on the question are more numerous than one would
suppose, though the total number is not large. The older English cases 0 uphold the view that duress of the principal is no defense for the surety and cases following the English view are found
in Massachusetts," Illinois,12 and Maine. 13 According to these
decisions, duress is a defense available only for him on whom the
duress is practiced; the duress to which the principal is subjected
in no way affects the free judgment of the surety and therefore
he should not be allowed to escape liability on that ground. The
case of Springfield Card Manufacturing Co. v. West 4 is quoted
as an authority for this view but the decision really turned on
estoppel; the court said the bail was estopped to deny that his
principal was liable to arrest.
Cases supporting the opposite view, that duress5 of the principal is a defense for the surety, are found in Alabama, New York,16
Tennessee,17 Indiana 8 and New Jersey."5 The opinion in Coffelt
v. Wise,20 expresses the legal reasons for this view: "There are
reasons which . . . are conclusive why a surety should not
be held upon a contract to which his principal has a valid defence,
not of a personal character, but going to the contract itself, as
fraud, duress, want or failure of consideration, etc. If the surety
is bound by such contract, one of two things must follow. The
surety, having been compelled to pay the money due by the contract, must either have his action against his principal to recover
the amount paid, or he must lose it. If the first alternative is
to be adopted, and the surety may maintain an action against
his principal to recover the money paid, then the principal will be
.compelled virtually to pay upon a contract to which he has a
9
Supra.
'0Huscombe v. Standing, supra; Mantel v. Gibbs, i Brownl. & Golds. 64
(Eng. x6Io).
"Springfield Card Mfg. Co. v. West, i Cush. 388 (Mass. 1848); Robinson
v. Gould,
ii Cush. 55 (Mass. 1853).
12
Plummer v. The People, i6 I. 358 (1855).
130ak v. Dustin, 79 Me. 23, 7 Atl. 8r5 (1887).
"Supra.
U5 State v. Brantley, 27 Ala. 44 (1855).
"cStrong
v. Grannis, 26 Barb. 122 (N. Y. 1857).
1TOwens v. Mynatt, supra.
"sCoffelt v. Wise, supra.
9
Schuster v. Arena, supra.
20Supra. Quotation from page 458 of the opinion.
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complete defence. . . . On the other hand, if the surety,
having been compelled to pay the money to the creditor, cannot
recover it from his principal, he must lose it, and equal injustice
is done."
This case is also important because it offers the first suggestion of a new aspect of this question which has been developed
into a rule of law that is generally recognized, at least by the
text writers. After the statements quoted above the court goes
on to say: "These reasons apply with less force, if at all, to cases
of suretyship for persons under disabilities as infants, married
women, etc. In such cases the surety may be supposed to have
been appraised of the disability of his principal to make a binding
contract and to have entered upon the suretyship with reference
to that fact." It is to be implied that the court believed a surety
usually to be ignorant of the duress practiced upon his principal,
whenever that condition does in fact exist. In the case of Griffith
v. Sitgreaves" 1 this idea of knowledge was made the basis of a new
rule which, since the date of that case, has met with the approval
of authorities on suretyship. The court says, "I have no doubt
of the correctness of the general principle laid down in the older
cases that duress, to be a good plea, must be offered to the person
who seeks to take advantage of it. . . . In all the cases cited,
the duress was either upon the party seeking to avoid the instrument sued upon, or it was known to him."22 Then Mr. Justice
Paxson reviews the older cases, and alleges that in all of them the
sureties had knowledge of the duress when they became sureties,
and lays down the rule that when the surety is ignorant of the
duress practiced upon his principal at the time he enters into the
contract of suretyship, he can successfully plead the duress and
escape liability on that ground. The rule is absolutely without
authority, because the cases referred to did not turn on the question of knowledge and none of them mention the fact that the
surety had knowledge of the duress practiced on his principal,
but it is reasonable and seems to work justice. Childs 23 and Spencer 2' state the law in terms of this Pennsylvania rule, though there
are few cases which they can cite as supporting it. Of course,
the Pennsylvania courts follow it2 5 and it has been quoted as law
in the Circuit Court of the United States.26 It is also the law of
27
Georgia but the result was achieved by legislative enactment.
A few cases allow the surety to plead the duress practiced on
his principal, when there are bonds of blood or marital relation219o Pa. i61 (1879).
"At page 165.
nSupra.
24
Supra.
25
Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa. 35, 84 At]. 131 (1912); Walton v. American
Surety26Co., supra.
Hazard v. Griswold, 21 Fed. 178 (1884).
27
Patterson v. Gibson, 81 Ga. 802, IOS. E. 9 (1888).
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ship between the surety and the principal of such an intimate
degree that whatever affects the principal will also affect the
surety. The relationship which the law recognizes under such
circumstances ranges from that of father and son's to mother-inlaw and son-in-law.29 But such cases are beyond the problem
under discussion, because they really are based on the proposition
that when such a bond exists, principal and surety are one in
thought and the duress practiced on the principal is also practiced on the surety.
This practically exhausts the authorities, although there
are other cases cited in the texts and in the cases. But upon
examination it will be found that what they say on the subject
is dicta. 30 They are used because the material is not so plentiful
as the text writers could wish for and hence they are interpreted
beyond their real meaning.
E. L. P.
EFFECT OF MISTAKE OF PERSON, MISREPRESENTATION OF
PERSON AND IMPERSONATION IN CRIMES, CONTRACTS AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.-An interesting question arises in the law

of crimes, contracts, sales, carriers and negotiable instruments,
when the courts have had to determine the effect of mistake of
person, misrepresentation of person and impersonation. A review
of the decisions of the courts on this question reveals the existence
of some slight confusion, but the decisions on analogous situations in these branches of the law are not inconsistent in the methods of reasoning used and the conclusions reached.
In the law of crimes when A, who wants to kill B, mistakes
X for B and wounds him, the courts have uniformly held A guilty
on an indictment for assault and battery with intent to kill X.
A wounded X because he believed him to be B whom he wanted
to kill. He did not want to kill X, but he did intend to kill the
person physically present before him. Since the person wounded
was the person physically present before him, it follows that A
intended to commit an assault and battery on X with intent to
kill him. By this reasoning the intent, to which the courts give
effect, is based on the facts of the assault and not on A's belief.
Thus the specific intent necessary for the crime was present.,
The question arises in the law governing the formation of
executory contracts in the following type of case: A writes to B,
using the name of X and represents himself to be X; B is induced
21 Osborn v. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365 (1867).

2Fountain v. Bigham, supra.
3OHawes v. Marchant, r Curtis 136 (U. S. Circuit Ct., 1852); Tucker v.
The State, 72 Ind. 242 (188o); Putnam v. Schuyler, 4 Hun. 166 (N. Y. 1875);
Thompson v. Lockwood, 15 Johns. 256 (N. Y. 1818); Simms v. Barefoot's
Exrs., 2 Haywood 6o6 (N. C. i8o6); Thompson v. Buckhannon, 2 J. J. Marshall
416 (Ky. 1829).

'Regina v. Smith, 33 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 567 (1855); People v. Torres,

38 Cal. 141 (1869); McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772 (1885).
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to enter into negotiations with A on the faith of this representatiorr
with the view of forming a contract. There must be a meeting
of the minds of the parties to make a valid contract. Therefore,
the courts have held that the completion of the negotiations so.
entered into will not effect a contract. B did not know A, and
X was the only person with whom he believed he was negotiating.
B's mind never for an instant rested on A, and X was a stranger
to the negotiations.2 There was no consensus ad idem between
the parties to the negotiations. The effect of B's intention in
this situation, based on the facts of the transaction, render the
completed negotiations void as a contract. 3 By the same reasoning, there is no contract effected when A represents himself to B,
in person or by letter, to be the agent of X, a person of good repute,
when in fact A is not the agent of X. On the strength of this
representation B is induced to enter into negotiations with A as
such agent. Here, again, B did not intend to contract with A,
on the reputation of X
but entered into the negotiations relying
4
and intended to contract with X only.
The question is found in the law of sales in three classes
of cases. The first class of cases in which the question arises is
when A, using the name of X and representing himself to be X,
writes to B and orders goods from him. Relying on the representation and in compliance with the order, B forwards the goods
which A obtains possession of at the place of delivery. The courts
apply the same reasoning as in the analogous situation in the law
of contracts and hold that the transaction was not a sale. A
got no title to the goods. From the facts of the transaction it
cannot be said that B intended to sell to A. He intended to sell
to X and consented to vest his title to the goods in X only. 5
The second class of cases arises when A falsely represents
himself to B, in person or by letter, to be the agent of X, and induces B to let him have goods on the strength of this misrepresentation. The courts have decided that this transaction is not
a sale and that A gets no title to the goods. The decisions rest
on the same grounds as in the analogous case in the law of contracts. B, relying on the reputation of X, the principal, intended
to sell only to him and would not have permitted A to have the
goods if X were not his principal.6
The recent case of Phillips v. Brooks, Limited,7 presents in
the law of sales the third class of case in which the question under
2Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cases 459 (Eng. 1878)
3Story on Contracts, Vol. i, p. 519; Pollock, Contracts, 3rd. Am. Ed.
184, p. 2o6.
(1906)4 p. 592; Anson, Law of Contracts, Am. Ed. (919)1
Kingsford v. Merry, I H. & N. 503, 156 Eng. Rep. Exch. 1299 (I856);.
Rogers v. Dutton, i8o Mass. 187, 65 N. E. 56 (1902).
'Cundy v. Lindsay, supra; Bruhl v. Coleman et al. 113 Ga. i1o2, 39 S. E.
481 (igoi).
6
Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427 (1872); Peters Box Co. v. Lesh, 1i9
Ill. 98,7 20 N. E. 291 (1889).
Phillips v. Brooks, Limited, (1919) 2 K. B. 243.
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discussion arises. A impersonated X, a well known man about
town, and induced B, on the strength of the impersonation, to
sell him jewelry. A, in this case, was physically present before B,
and the situation on its facts is substantially the same as the one
in criminal law above. In deciding that A got title to the goods
and that B could not recover the goods from A's vendee, who was
a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the court followed
the reasoning used by the courts in the analogous situation in
criminal law.8 B believed that X was before him and that he was
selling the jewelry to X it is true; it is also true that B would
not have sold the goods to A if he had known that A was not X.
However, A, not X, was physically present before him, identified
by sight and hearing, and B did intend to sell the goods to A, the
person in front of him, and since A was a party to the agreement
to sell there was a meeting of the minds of the parties to all of
the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the transaction was a
sale and title to the goods passed to A.9 The intention of B to
sell to A is based on the facts of the transaction and is clearly
correct. This is the view adopted by the
majority of the courts
1
of the United States in recent decisions. 0
The same question arises in determining the liability of a
carrier to the consignor of goods for a delivery to an impostor.
When A in person, representing himself as X, induces B to let
him have goods on the strength of the impersonation and B entrusts the goods to a carrier for delivery to X, in the absence of
negligence qua the delivery, the carrier is not liable in trover and
conversion if he delivers the goods to A. The courts put the
decision on the grounds that the delivery was in accordance with
B's directions, since A was physically present at the time of the
sale, he was the person to whom the goods were sent." The
81t is interesting to note that this is the first time this question was decided

in England and that the court of Kings Bench bases its decision on the case of
Edmunds v. Merchants Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883), in which
the same reasoning is used.
9It must be remembered that the title to the goods acquired by A is not
indefeasible. It is subject to be avoided by the vendor before the rights of innocent third parties intervene.
"Perkins et al. v. Anderson et al. 65 Iowa 398 (1884); Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231 (1886); Hickey v. McDonald Bros., i5I Ala. 497 (1907);
Phelps v. McQuade, 22o N. Y. 232 (1917). However, in Loeffel v. Pohlman,
47 Mo. App. 574 (i89I) and Windle v. Citizens' National Bank, 216 S. W. 1023
(Mo. 1920), it is held on the same state of facts that no title to the goods passes
from B to A. The decisions in these cases are based on decisions in cases of
misrepresentations of person by writing .and misrepresentation of agency and
the courts fail to recognize the distinctions that exist in these cases.
"Dunbar v. Boston & Providence R. R. Co., iio Mass. 26 (1872); Edmunds v. Merchants Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883). While these
cases are justified on the principle that a carrier is not liable for delivery of
goods to the true owner made in disregard of the directions of the consignor,
The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575 (1876), they can hardly be justified on the grounds
given by the courts; for the directions given by the consignor were "deliver to
X" and the carrier delivered the goods to A. Such a delivery can not be said
to be in accordance with the directions of the consignor.
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contractual liability of the carrier is thus discharged. It is quite
clear in this situation that A was the true owner of the goods.12
In the situations in this branch of the law analogous to the first
two classes of cases in the law of sales a different concept of the
question is found. The carrier is not liable for the delivery of
goods to an impostor which were addressed to him, if there was
no negligence qua the delivery. The reason for this is that the
contract of the carrier is to deliver according to directions. It
is under no duty to ascertain the title of the consignee in these
cases. The carrier is, therefore, justified in delivering the goods,
as addressed, to the impostor.13
In the law of negotiable instruments this question is also
raised in three classes of cases analogous to those in the law of
sales. The first arises when A obtains delivery of a check or
negotiable instrument by writing a letter to B representing that
he is X, whom B knows. It is held that the drawee bank can not
charge B with the amount paid by it on the check. By applying
the reasoning used in the same situation in sales it follows that B
did not intend the money to be paid on A's order. He intended
the money to be paid on the order of X only, hence the bank
paid the money on the order of someone not intended by B and
the bank is liable for the money paid. 4
When A falsely represents that he is the agent of X, whom
B knows, when in fact he is not X's agent, and on the faith of the
misrepresentation B gives him a check payable to X, the second
class of cases is presented. A indorses the check with X's name
and the bank is liable for the amount paid by it on the check.
A was not intended as payee of the check by B. B intended the
money to be paid only on X's order."5 The reasoning used to
reach this result is consistent with that used in the same situation
in the law of sales.
The third class of cases in which the question is found is
when A, impersonating X, applies to B for a loan and obtains
personal delivery of a check or negotiable instrument. B cannot
recover from the drawee bank the amount it paid on the check.
It is true B believed that he delivered the check to X and he wanted
X to be the payee, yet actually B delivered the check to the person
who was physically present before him, and he is. held to have
intended that that person be the payee. The drawee bank, therefore, paid the money to the order of a person to whose order B
12

phelps v. McQuade and Phillips v. Brooks, Limited, supra.

'3McKean v. McIvor et at., (187O) L. R. 6 Exch. 36; Samuel v. Cheney,

135 Mass. 278 (1883). As to cases having similar facts but when there is negligence qua the delivery see: American Express Co. v. Fletcher, 25 Ind. 492
(1865); Price v. Oswego & Syracuse R. R. Co., 5o N. Y. 213 (1872); Pacific Express Co.
14 v. Shearer, I6o Ill. 215 (1896).
Mercantile National Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. i (N. Y. 1911).
15Goodfellow v. First Nat. Bank, 71 Wash. 554 (1913).
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is held to have intended it to be paid, and is not liable for such
payment. 6
In the analogous situations existing in the above branches of
the law the reasoning used by the courts in determining the effect
of mistake of person, misrepresentation of person and impersonation are consistent and the results, as affecting the person claiming
a right in these situations, are essentially the same. The only
exception is found in the law of carriers in the cases where there
is misrepresentation of person by writing or a misrepresentation
of agency, in which cases the carrier is not liable in the absence
of negligence qua the delivery of the goods.
J. G. L.
16
Emporia Nat. Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360 (r886); U. S. v. National
Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (I891); Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwest
National Bank, I96 Pa. 230 (igoo). For a general discussion on this see: Brannen's Negotiable Instruments Law, 3rd. Ed. 1919. pp. 80-90, 322, 323, 347.

